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Abstract 
 
A randomly selected number from the infinite set of positive integers—the so-called de 
Finetti lottery—will not be a finite number.  I argue that it is still possible to conceive of 
an infinite lottery, but that an individual lottery outcome is knowledge about set-
membership and not element identification.  Unexpectedly, it appears that a uniform 
distribution over a countably infinite set has much in common with a continuous 
probability density over an uncountably infinite set. 
 
Introduction 
 
     De Finetti [1974] wanted to know if we could make sense of a random lottery 
containing countably infinite tickets using standard axiomatic probability theory.  He 
discovered a problem.  Given a countably infinite set of options, it appears impossible to 
assign any non-zero probability to each option without violating the basic axioms.  If the 
lottery contained only one-billion tickets there would be no problem—simply assign one 
billionth to each ticket.  But infinity is the number we are dealing with, and one divided 
by infinity is zero according to our mathematicians.  Although assigning zero probability 
to each ticket is not a problem in itself, once we assume that at least some ticket is 
selected, it is contradictory to say that the probability of that selection was exactly zero. 
     There have been attempts to resolve the contradiction implied by the de Finetti lottery, 
for instance, by abandoning the troublesome axiom that yields the contradiction or 
invoking non-standard measure theory (Bartha [2004], Vallentyne [2000]).  Having 
strong empiricist tendencies, I was compelled to simulate an approximate infinite lottery 
on a computer.  Of course it is impossible to simulate countably infinite options on a 
finite computer.  In fact, this has been an argument itself against the infinite de Finetti 
lottery— no physical mechanism can make selections over an infinite range of elements 
(Howson and Urbach [1993]).  Fortunately one need only do an approximate simulation 
to get a feel for what the true infinite lottery would look like. 
 
Simulated lotteries 
 
     Do this on a computer.  Start with a set of ten numbers and perform an equally likely 
(random) selection across them.  No real surprises here.  On average you see each 
number, one through ten, appear after performing a dozen or so simulations.  Now 
increase your lottery to have one billion tickets.  There is now a 99% chance that you will 
see a number greater than ten-million on the first simulated outcome.  While all numbers 
are equally likely, you are almost certain to see a number that looks large because large 
looking numbers are so common1.  Extending the range of the lottery even further, 
perhaps to a number represented by a one followed by one-thousand zeros, you are nearly 
guaranteed to select a seemingly gigantic number even if you make one billion selections.  
In this case you are nearly certain to choose a number with hundreds of digits.  That 
seems pretty big.  As the number of tickets in our lottery tends to infinity, it would appear 
that we are sure to choose a really, really, huge number; a number bigger than any finite 
number – infinity. 
 
Lottery analysis 
 
     A simple limit analysis will clarify the situation somewhat and show that the 
simulation is unneeded to justify the conclusion.  Suppose we have a lottery with N 
tickets that are labeled one through N.  Now choose any finite number a<N.  Let x 
represent the value of the ticket that is randomly selected where each ticket is 
equiprobable, then 
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It is easy enough to evaluate the limit as N goes to infinity (zero for the top expression 
and one for the bottom).  Regardless of the value you specify for a, so long as a is finite 
you are assured with probability one that the value obtained in the infinite lottery will be 
greater than a.  In other words, if you were to bet on an infinite lottery, simply ask your 
competitor to write down the largest number she knows, then bet that the number drawn 
from the lottery will be bigger than the number she specified and you are certain to win.  
Further, since the outcome of the lottery will be greater than a for any assigned value a, 
the outcome x cannot be finite, as this would imply that we could assign a value to a that 
was finite and greater than x (such as x+1), which would contradict the assumption that 
P(x≤a)=0. 
                                                 
1 While ten-million may appear to be a large number, on a scale between zero and one-billion it is small. 
Not surprisingly, it is among the one-percent smallest numbers on that scale. 
     The above argument is consistent with the inference drawn from the pseudo-
simulations: an outcome of the de Finetti infinite lottery is not finite.  To make this 
argument I have assumed  
 
1) Equiprobability between outcomes (Principle of Indifference) 
2) Non-zero probability for each outcome before taking the limit  
 
I cannot envision how one would physically run an infinite lottery, nor am I certain what 
an outcome of an infinite lottery would look like, but I am fairly sure that it will not be a 
finite ticket number and I will place good money against anyone who says otherwise.  It 
appears that an outcome of the de Finetti lottery will be larger than any a priori conceived 
finite value, which is not too troubling given that we are working with an infinite number 
of alternatives.  Can we say that the outcome of this lottery is infinity?  Perhaps, but the 
meaning of that statement is not entirely clear.   For instance, it does not imply that there 
exists a ticket with the infinity symbol drawn on it, and that this ticket will be selected 
with certainty.  The infinite ticket does not exist as such.   We can only imagine this 
infinite ticket because of the order-type of the natural numbers.2  Changing the ordering 
may change the result.  A lottery over the integers using a similar analysis as above 
would also suggest a non-finite outcome, however, now both positive and negative 
infinity become potential outcomes.  Can we assign ½ probability to each?   
     Let us first consider an analogous example that avoids order.  Instead of the well-
ordering of the de Finetti lottery over the natural numbers, assume that there is a 
countably infinite but unordered set, for instance, an infinite stack of playing cards with a 
unique picture on each card.  Without ordering it makes little sense to speak of the 
infinite card.  Now arbitrarily partition the stack of cards into a finite subset of cards and 
an infinite subset of cards using any mechanism you like, physical or not.   Keep in mind 
that the notion of countable infinity, as it is commonly understood in the Cantorian sense, 
allows one to partition an infinite set into a finite set and another infinite set with the 
same cardinality (size) as the original set.  Next ask someone to choose at random a card 
from the entire collection of cards—the person chooses not knowing that you have made 
an arbitrary finite partition, and your partition does not affect the selection process.  Since 
the infinite partition of cards is infinitely larger than the finite partition, and the person is 
selecting a card at random, the odds and probability that the selected card will be in the 
finite partition are zero.3  It follows that the selected card will be a member of the infinite 
partition.  Further, since the outcome will be a member of the infinite partition for any 
given finite partition, the outcome cannot be contained in any finite partition a priori, as 
                                                 
2 I use the word ‘order’ in the technical, set-theoretic sense.  The natural numbers and integers are both 
countably infinite sets that have the same cardinality but differ in order-type. 
3 The limit analysis here is identical to the analysis used above, where ‘the size of the finite set’ in this 
example takes the place of the arbitrarily chosen finite number a in the previous example.  
this would imply that we could create an arbitrary finite partition that contained the 
selected card, which would contradict the assumption that the probability of finding the 
card in the finite partition is zero. 
     This conclusion can be generalized to the de Finetti infinite lottery without altercation, 
and forms the main assertion of this paper:  Given a uniform probability distribution over 
a countably infinite set the outcome of a selection will not be a member of any a priori 
identified finite set of alternatives.  It seems reasonable to interpret the a priori 
impossibility of finite set membership as a zero probability measure over every 
conceivable finite set of alternatives.  Although the outcome will not be a member of any 
finite set of alternatives, we conclude without contradiction that the outcome will be a 
member of a countably infinite set of alternatives.  Since non-zero probability measure is 
only defined over an infinite set taken as a single object – and this is important – the 
‘outcome’ of an infinite lottery can only tell us the set-membership of the selected 
element and nothing about the particular element itself.  Why is this so?  I argue out of 
consistency.  If all finite sets of alternatives have zero probability measure, and only 
infinite sets have non-zero probability, then it is inconsistent to acknowledge a particular 
a posterior finite outcome.   Consider again the de Finetti lottery.  It seems clear that the 
drawn ticket will not be any finite number.  We may say that the outcome will be 
infinitely large, but that too is ambiguous and depends upon the order-type of the natural 
numbers.  It is clearer and more general to say that the outcome of the de Finetti lottery 
will be a member of an infinite set of alternatives—for natural numbers that implies an 
infinite set ‘off to the right’.   While this statement appears to be a tautology (it is an 
assumption of the de Finetti lottery), it does provide new information.  Most pertinently, 
you would never bet that the outcome will be found in any finite set of a priori 
alternatives. 
 
The ‘outcome’ of an infinite lottery 
 
     Although until this point I have not made a direct appeal to infinitesimal probabilities, 
it seems clear that I have assumed the existence of infinitely small probability measures 
that when collected into an infinite-sized set sum to a finite number.  Non-standard 
infinitesimal probabilities have been used to make sense of countably infinite sets in 
previous work (Vallentyne [2000], Bartha and Hitchcock [1999]), however, the 
conclusions and application in the present work differ considerably.  While I 
acknowledge that the outcomes in the infinite lottery are equiprobable, I deny that our 
outcome will be contained in any finite set of alternatives.  If my knowledge of real-
analysis were adequate, I believe I could say in a more rigorous manner—through formal 
proof—that the outcome of an infinite lottery will almost surely not be contained in any 
finite set of alternatives.  Further, since non-infinitesimal probability measure can only be 
defined over a countably infinite set taken as whole where each individual alternative is 
almost surely not going to occur, an outcome corresponding to this measure is one of set-
membership and not of element identification.  In other words, for an infinite lottery one 
cannot know the ticket that was chosen, but only the set to which the ticket belongs.  That 
is a strange situation, but it seems to be ‘empirically’ supported by inference from a large 
but finite lottery.   
     Our apparently strange conclusion here is not completely novel, in fact, Bartha [2004] 
in an analysis of the de Finetti lottery using the concept of relative betting quotients came 
to a similar conclusion stating that “…the propositions ‘ticket n wins’ and ‘some ticket 
wins’ are probabilistically incommensurable.”  We are told these propositions are 
incommensurable because the relative betting quotients for ‘ticket n wins’ are undefined, 
although it would not be too great a leap to say that the probability that ‘ticket n wins’ is 
infinitesimal while ‘some ticket wins’ is a finite, and therefore we cannot directly 
compare these propositions.  In light of the preceding analysis, I am not completely 
confident that the proposition ‘some ticket wins’ even makes sense.   The best we can say 
in the language of probability is that ‘the chosen ticket belongs to an infinite set’.  
Selection of a ticket in an infinite lottery is an almost imaginary process that tells us 
nothing about the ticket other than the set it belongs too.  I cannot help but feel that the 
Axiom of Choice has an important part to play in the random selection of one element 
from an unordered countably infinite set.   We cannot constructive demonstrate how such 
a selection would take place, yet we intuit that it is possible in some sense, relying upon 
an axiom to get the job done.  Perhaps the price we pay for invoking the Axiom of 
Choice is incomplete knowledge about the actual selection. 
 
A ‘mixed’ discrete distribution and the negated event 
 
     In the following example I will show that uniform distributions over countably infinite 
sets may arise from a negated event.  Additionally, negation is coupled to the notion that 
the information of a probabilistic outcome may be limited to set-membership information 
and nothing more.  The example will make these words more obvious.   
 
Example 1.  A ‘mixed’ distribution and the negated event.  Suppose the only thing we 
know about a probability distribution over the natural numbers is that the probability of 
selecting the number one is 1/4.  It follows that the probability that one is not selected is 
given by 4/3)1( =¬=xP .   
 
     Since we are told that the sample space is the set of natural numbers N, the event 
1¬=x  is equivalent to the event 1...},4,3,2{ ¬=∈x .  We may invoke a symmetry 
argument (indifference argument) and reason that the probability 3/4 is uniformly spread 
over the countably infinite collection of elements in {2, 3, 4,…}.  The ‘mixed’ 
distribution is explicitly: 
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I call this distribution a mixed distribution because it is analogous to so-called mixed 
probability density functions where part of the density function is infinitely concentrated 
at discrete locations and part is finitely concentrated but continuously spread.  In this 
example the probability is ‘infinitely dense’ at x=1 relative to other values.  Anyone who 
has worked with mixed density functions will find this analogy compelling.  It appears 
that de Finetti’s infinite lottery is not completely contrived, and is somehow analogous to 
the probability of a negated event that is contained in an infinite sample space. 
     The idea that the outcome of a uniform infinite selection is one of set-membership and 
not element identification directly follows from this example of the negated event, 
however, any negation in a finite example would have yielded a similar result.  Here is 
another hand-waving explanation of why all outcomes of uniform infinite selections 
correspond to set-membership.  Given a uniform infinite selection, we know that the 
outcome will be non-finite, and perhaps this necessary negation implies that we cannot 
know the selected element but only the membership of that element.  It has been argued 
elsewhere that the negated event plays a special role in connecting with the sample space 
in probability theory (Burock [2005]).    
 
Density functions and uniform countably infinite distributions 
 
     Continuous density functions over the real line R can help us understand the 
mysterious de Finetti infinite lottery.  We rarely acknowledge in probabilistic practice 
that the sets of outcomes on R are typically uncountably infinite.  When manipulating 
continuous density functions and computing probability, the question almost always takes 
the following form:  what is the probability that outcome x falls within the interval [a, b], 
or P(a≤x≤b)?  The number of elements contained between the interval [a, b] can be 
denoted by the infinite cardinal number 1ℵ .  The analogy to the de Finetti infinite lottery 
should be clear.  I have argued that for a uniform distribution over a countably infinite set 
N, it only makes sense to ask about )( AxP ∈  where A is some countably infinite subset 
of N, just like over an uncountably infinite set R, it only makes sense to ask ]),[( baxP ∈  
where [a, b] is some uncountably infinite subset of R.  The probability of each element in 
A is zero or infinitesimal, just like the probability of each element of [a, b].   An obvious 
disanalogy is that the density over [a, b] need not be uniform.  In the Appendix of this 
work I show how the concept of density can be applied to countably infinite sets. 
 
Conclusions 
 
    After all of this one may still counter quite easily that the de Finetti lottery is simply 
impossible.  Perhaps, but for consistency one should then also declare all continuous 
probability density functions impossible as well; a situation that would deprive quantum 
physics of its most useful tool.  One may view the de Finetti countably infinite lottery as 
a bridging concept between finite probability examples and continuous examples.  More 
mathematically capable individuals should be able to unify the two more rigorously than 
was done here.  The outcomes of uniform countably infinite draws can only give us 
information about set-membership, analogous to continuous probability on the real line.  
Importantly, not all uniform countably infinite distributions are equivalent.  The formal 
set-theoretic order-type of an infinite set will differentiate one uniform countably infinite 
distribution from another. 
 
Appendix 
 
The Density of a Countably Infinite Set 
 
This Appendix suggests how the concept of density may be extended to countably 
infinite sets, and provides several examples illustrating how this concept may be applied 
to answer probabilistic questions.  Nothing below (or in this entire work) is 
mathematically rigorous.   
 
     Here is the situation I wish to understand.  Suppose we are given the set N={1,2,3,…} 
and are told that there is a uniform distribution of probability over the set.  For generality, 
note that P(N) need not equal one (other values may be possibly but we are ignoring them 
for now).  From this given information and nothing more, derive the probability 
distribution of ODD={1, 3, 5, …).  For a given probability distribution over a set, it 
should be possible to derive the distribution of a (reasonable) subset of elements from the 
given distribution.  A practical understanding of probability should at least give us this.  
While one can use a symmetry argument to answer this question, such as 
P(N)=P(ODD)+P(EVEN)=2P(ODD) where I am indifferent to ODD and EVEN and thus 
assign equal probability; I should not have to do this.  In finite examples we do not 
invoke symmetry arguments to derive the probability of a subset of elements – we simply 
calculate it.  What about more difficult infinite examples?  For instance, given a uniform 
distribution over N, what is the probability of A={1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, …}? It is not clear 
how symmetry can help us here, at least not trivially, yet intuitively A should have some 
finite probability of occurring given a uniform distribution over N.  Both A and N have 
countably infinite members, so we cannot argue that the size of A is less than N. 
     For finite discrete examples of probability it is common to talk about the number of 
alternatives corresponding to events, but this is not the case for continuous examples of 
probability.  We understand continuous probability using the theory and language of 
density functions and integration.  The number of alternatives has little or no meaning in 
continuous probability because most typical intervals over the real numbers have an 
uncountably infinite number of elements denoted by the continuum or cardinal number 
1ℵ .  Although each interval has uncountably infinite possibilities, it is still possible to 
assign more or less probability to a particular interval via the density function over that 
interval.  The density function tells us in some sense about the ‘spacing’ of elements 
within a particular neighborhood of the real line, even though it says nothing about the 
number of elements.  Density is how we differentiate uncountably infinite sets on the real 
line, and perhaps we can analogously apply a similar principle to countably infinite sets.  
For illustrative purposes, in Figure 1 on the left I show a schematic diagram of a 
continuous probability density function on the real line.  The point is that two intervals 
may each contain an uncountably infinite set of elements but be measured differently 
because of the density of each interval.   
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    Consider again the task of deriving the probability of ODD from N.  It is obvious that  
N={1, 2, 3,…} and ODD={1, 3, 5,…} differ in some way, but it is not in the size of the 
sets.   Whereas the sizes are equivalent, we may argue with an analogy to density 
functions that the relative ‘packing’ or ‘density’ of elements differ between the two sets.  
Looking at the right hand side of Figure 1, it seems reasonable to say that the elements of 
ODD are half as densely packed as the elements of N.  We can therefore infer that the 
probability measure over ODD will be half that of N, for ODD contains half of N’s 
density.  Again, why do I argue in this way?  The answer is that I wish to be able to 
derive ODD’s probability from N rather than invoke symmetry arguments that seem 
unneeded in the finite and uncountably infinite case.  Further, the concept of density 
applied to countably infinite sets has practical utility.  Be aware that this notion of density 
is a relative measure that can only be defined relative to a given sample space of interest.   
 
Example 1.  Given a uniform distribution over N={1, 2, 3, …}, what is the probability of 
selecting at random an element x from the subset A={1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, …}?  We can 
decompose A into A1={1, 6, 11, …} and A2={4, 9, 14, …}.  Each of these infinite sets has 
1/5 the density of N, therefore 5/2)( =∈ AxP . 
 
Example 2.  Given a uniform distribution over N={1, 2, 3, …}, what is the probability of 
selecting at random an element x from the subset A={1, 10, 100…}?  The mean interval 
between the elements in A is infinity, therefore A is infinitely less dense than N and 
.0)( =∈ AxP  
 
Example 3.  Given a uniform distribution over a countably infinite set B that contains 
elements separated by a mean interval E(IB)= µB, what is the probability of selecting at 
random an element x from an infinite subset A that contains elements separated by a 
mean interval E(IA)=µA?  ./)( ABAxP µµ=∈   This attempt at a generalization is 
undefined when µB is infinite and also requires that the set B is ordered like the natural 
numbers.  It fails to hold, for instance, on the integers which have a different order-type, 
although we can reorder the integers as {0, -1, 1, -2, 2,…} and meaningfully apply the 
density concept as above. 
 
     This next example addresses probability over countably infinite sets but only 
indirectly deals with the notion of density as above.  I include it here in the hope that it 
will encourage us to think carefully before creating and analyzing additional so-called 
paradoxes to the Principle of Indifference.   
 
Example 4.  The re-labeling paradox (Bartha 2004, attributed to John Norton).  Briefly, 
let ONE={1, 5, 9,…}, TWO={2, 6, 10,…}, THREE={3, 7, 11,…}, and FOUR={4, 8, 12, 
…}.  Now select a natural number x at random.  Bartha first reasonably assumes that 
4/1)FOUR()THREE()TWO()ONE( =∈=∈=∈=∈ xPxPxPxP .4  The paradox is 
derived by mapping the original outcome space to a new outcome space in three steps, 
where the mapping f: N→N’ is represented by the following table: 
 
 
 
 
The odd numbers in N’ correspond to the set ONE in N.  We assume that 2/1)ODD( =P , 
but after re-labeling we may also reason that 4/1)ONE()ODD( == PP  since ODD and 
ONE represent different names for the same set of elements, creating a contradiction.   
     I do not agree that this is a contradiction or paradox, rather, I see yet another example 
that all probabilities are conditional on a given sample space (Burock [2005], Hajek 
[2003]).  This re-labeling paradox is no different than Bertrand’s chord paradox so many 
years ago, both of which arise when we begin with a particular sample space and then 
                                                 
4 I have greatly distorted and ignored the language of relative betting quotients used in Bartha [2004].  
Although useful and interesting, they are unneeded in the present formulation while using the language of 
this paper. 
1→1’ 2→4’ 3→2’ 
5→3’ 4→8’ 7→6’ 
9→5’ 6→12’ 11→10’
… … … 
map this given space to a new infinite sample space.  We are given in the problem that 
4/1...}),9,5,1{( =∈xP  and then told to map {1, 5, 9,…}→{1’, 3’, 5’,…}.  If you have 
mapped correctly, your probability measure had better give 4/1...}),'5,'3,'1{( =∈xP , 
for these events correspond to the same outcome.  If we had not attempted this mapping 
from the given sample space, then it would be reasonable to invoke the Principle of 
Indifference and argue 2/1...}),'5,'3,'1{( =∈xP .  But these are two completely different 
situations, one that involves a re-mapping from a given sample space and another that 
assumes a completely different sample space.  In this example we should not be surprised 
that )'|...},'5,'3,'1{( NP and )'|...},'5,'3,'1{( NN →P  have different measures of 
probability under the assumption of Indifference because the two propositions are 
fundamentally different entities.  By what reasoning must Indifference give the same 
probability to completely different situations?  While the Principle of Indifference may 
yield identical probabilities in some remapped sample spaces (finite spaces for example), 
it is not required to do so.  There has never yet been as some authors say a ‘reckless use 
of the Principle of Indifference’, but only the faulty guidance of intuition in propelling us 
to compare unlike situations.  
 
 
References 
 
Bartha, P. and Hitchcock, C. [1999]: ‘The Shooting-Room Paradox and Conditionalizing 
on “Measurably Challenged” Sets’, Synthese, 118, 403-37. 
Bartha, P. [2004]: ‘Coutable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery’, Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 55, 
301-321. 
Burock, M. [2005]: ‘Indifference, Sample Space, and the Wine/Water Paradox’, PhilSci 
Archive, Retreived Jan 10, 2006, from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002487/ 
de Finetti, B. [1974]: Theory of Probability, Vols 1 and 2, trans. A. Machí and A. Smith, 
New York: Wiley. 
Hajek, A. [2003]: ‘What Conditional Probability Could Not Be’, Synthese, 137, No. 3, 
273-323. 
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. [1993]: Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd ed, 
La Salle: Open Court Press. 
McCall, S. and Armstrong, D. [1989]: ‘God’s Lottery’, Analysis, 49, pp. 223-4. 
Vallentyne, P. [2000]: ‘Standard Decision Theory Corrected’, Synthese, 122, 261-290. 
 
 
